



**STRATEGY  
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**DETERMINING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD'S ROLE  
IN HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOW TO REORGANIZE  
THE GUARD TO ACCOMPLISH THAT MISSION**

BY 20020604 231

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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REORGANIZE THE GUARD TO ACCOMPLISH THAT MISSION**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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The purpose of this SRP is to define the role of the Army National Guard in HLS (excluding National Missile Defense) and is framed within three critical assumptions. First, the attacks on 11 September highlighted the need for military units organized, trained and equipped specifically for HLS. Secondly, it assumes no increases in force structure so current forces must be used. Finally, the ARNG is the only component within the Army with forces not allocated to a specific warfighting mission. Though all elements of the Total Force are key players in this mission, especially the Reserve Components, the scope of this paper is limited to the Army National Guard.

This paper begins by defining Homeland Security and the Army's role as currently identified in the draft Army HLS Planning Guidance and the Federal Emergency Response Plan. It then examines the capabilities of the ARNG using the current force structure metric, and assesses two courses of action as recommended by the National Defense Panel and the Hart-Rudman Commission on the role of the Army Guard in HLS. Finally, it will conclude with recommendations on the best method to employ the Army Guard and some force structure changes required to accomplish this.



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## **DETERMINING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD'S ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOW TO REORGANIZE THE GUARD TO ACCOMPLISH THAT MISSION**

Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security

—President George W. Bush

The horrific and unprecedented in scope terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. of 11 September 2001 propelled the issue of Homeland Security (HLS) to the first priority of American National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS).<sup>1</sup> As the United States develops the strategy and the ways and means to accomplish the end of securing the homeland, the role of the Reserve Components and especially the National Guard should be revised.<sup>2</sup> The Army National Guard should have a major role in Homeland Defense (HLD) based on its experience, community-based roots and historical traditions. However, the Army National Guard as a component of the Army must be capable of performing missions across the full spectrum of conflict to be a relevant member of the Total Force. Homeland Defense should not be its only mission.<sup>3</sup>

The purpose of this Strategic Research Project is to define the Army National Guard's role in HLS. This discussion is framed by three critical assumptions. First, the attacks on 11 September highlighted the need for military units organized, trained and equipped specifically for HLS. Secondly, it is unlikely the current Administration will advocate increased force structure; therefore, current DoD force structure must be used for HLS. Finally, the ARNG is the only component within the Army with forces not allocated to a specific warfighting mission. Though all elements of the Total Force to include the Reserve Components are key players in this mission, the scope of this paper is limited to the U.S. Army National Guard only.

In order to frame the discussion on the Army Guard's role in HLS, it is important to first define what HLS is and is not.<sup>4</sup> Secondly, define what the Army's role is according to the draft Army HLS Planning Guidance and the Federal Emergency Response Plan. This will provide the **ends** that the Army Guard could perform. It will examine the capabilities (**means**) of the Army Guard using the current force structure metric, then assess the two courses of action (**ways**) recommended by the National Defense Panel and the Hart-Rudman Commission on the role of the Army Guard in HLS. Finally, it will conclude with recommendations on the best method to employ the Army Guard and some general force structure changes required to accomplish this.

Though the National Guard's role in HLS certainly includes the Air Guard, this paper will limit its scope solely to the role of the Army Guard and will encompass all potential mission sets except National Missile Defense (NMD).

## DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY

The highest priority of the U.S. military is to defend the Nation from all enemies. The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders, as appropriate under U.S. law.

—2001 QDR

The responsibility of defending the homeland is currently shared by over forty federal agencies in addition to numerous state and local agencies.<sup>5</sup> The Department of Defense has yet to define what homeland security is or the missions and force structure required to accomplish those missions.<sup>6</sup> As Figure 1 illustrates, the Anser Institute for Homeland Security has provided a definition of the DoD components of Homeland Security sub-divided into the missions of civil support and homeland defense.<sup>7</sup>




FIGURE 1. ELEMENTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY

A June 2001 RAND Arroyo Center study commissioned by the Army differentiates **Homeland Defense**, a sub-set of Homeland Security, as those tasks specifically performed by military forces as opposed to those activities performed by civilian organizations. The report identifies and defines six potential threats to focus the Army's planning and preparation for Homeland Defense:<sup>8</sup>

- The threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including high explosives, either against the population; critical national infrastructure; elected and appointed leaders at the local, state, or federal level; or U.S. military forces.
- The threat of specialty weapons, such as mortars, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and man-portable air defense missiles, against the same targets.
- The threat of cyber attacks on mission-critical systems aimed at disrupting the continuity of military operations.
- The threat of WMD smuggling into the United States.
- The threat of large-scale refugee flows that can create threats to national security.
- The threat of the use of ballistic or cruise missiles against the nation.

Having defined the potential threats the report suggests that the Army's Homeland Defense mission be defined by five key military task areas: Weapons of Mass Destruction [hereafter referred to by its new designation: Weapons of Mass Effects (WME)]; domestic preparedness and civil support; continuity of government; border and coastal defense; continuity of military operations; and national missile defense.<sup>9</sup>

In January 2001, the Army developed and tentatively approved the following definition of Homeland Defense that includes both the requirement to "deter and defend against foreign and domestic threats;" and military support in response to natural and man-made disasters in its Draft *HLS: Strategic Planning Guidance*:

Protecting our territory, population, and infrastructure at home by deterring, defending against, and mitigating the effects of all threats to US sovereignty; supporting civil authorities in crisis and consequence management; and helping to insure the availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of critical national assets.<sup>10</sup>

The draft HLS Strategic Planning Guidance further refines objectives and divides the Homeland Defense mission into seven critical military tasks:

- **Land Defense:** The Army objective under Land Defense is to be prepared to participate as part of a joint force executing plans for defense of the United States and its territories.
- **Responding to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Incidents:** The Army objective in responding to CBRNE incidents is to organize, equip, and train units to timely, effectively and efficiently support the lead federal agency in its efforts to (1) reduce the vulnerabilities to CBRNE incidents; and (2) manage the consequences of CBRNE incidents.
- **National Missile Defense (NMD):** In the near-to-mid term the Army's objective is to perform those actions necessary to ensure the successful testing, deployment and operation of a land-based NMD system. The purpose of the NMD system as currently envisioned is to provide protection against limited ballistic missile attacks targeted at the United States. This protection will be achieved through integration of NMD system elements with Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA). The Army's Operational Concept for NMD can be found in TRADOC PAM 525-82.<sup>11</sup>
- **Combating Terrorism:** The Army objective under Combating Terrorism is to provide training, staffing and equipment resources and services to support domestic emergencies consistent with national security priorities, Federal Response Plan criteria, and U.S. Code dealing with employment of military forces within the United States.
- **Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP):** Protecting and defending critical infrastructure, including information and information systems. Army support will likely consist of equipment and forces to prevent the loss of, or assist in restoring, telecommunications, electric power, gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water, emergency services, and government continuity. The Army objective under CIP is to develop a capability to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability, and adequacy of those assets deemed critical to the United States.
- **Information Operations (IO):** The Army objective under IO is to provide information operations in support of HLS efforts. Information operations are defined as defensive and offensive operations taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. While there are situations where a retaliatory IO offensive strike directed at an external entity might be undertaken to stop an ongoing attack, the general expectation is that HLS IO missions will be defensive in nature.

- **Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA):** The Army objective under MACA is to provide essential support, services, assets, or specialized resources to help civil authorities deal with situations beyond their capabilities. MACA includes all of the actions that can be taken under the disaster-related Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).<sup>12</sup>

By definition, all disasters are local and response begins at that level. In his testimony before Congress, Secretary of the Army Thomas White noted that there are currently eleven million trained civilian first responders in the United States. Local, state and federal efforts were further divided into actions to prevent incidents and actions in response of incidents after they occurred. In 1993, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), *"United States Policy on Counterterrorism"* which defined incident anticipation and prevention as crisis management and incident response as consequence management.<sup>13</sup>

Under these definitions, the Department of Defense is in a support role to civil authorities for all missions except land defense and NMD.<sup>14</sup> The primary focus of recent studies concerning the Army's role in HLS is in the area of combating terrorism, especially as it relates to the mission of responding to CBRNE incidents, both in terms of support for domestic preparedness and assistance to civil authorities as a result of a terrorist or CBRNE attack (consequence management). In terms of Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, the National Guard was designated as the primary DoD agency for disaster relief following the 1997 QDR.<sup>15</sup>

<b>Operational Functions...</b>	
Security Operations	Information Operations
Key Asset Protection	Limited Battle Damage Repair
House and Comfort Displaced Individuals	Traffic Control Operations
Conduct Threat Assessments	Logistics Support Operations
Mass Casualty Operations	Assist Local Medical Service Providers
Coordination Activities between civil & military organizations	Operate Logistical Infrastructure
Liaison Operations	Supplement or Supplant inoperative communications systems
Training Activities for Military & Civilian Organizations	Air Defense Operations
Search & Rescue Operations	Presence Missions (show of force)
Mortuary Affairs	Recovery Operations
Legal Services	Demobilization and re-constitution
Intelligence Operations	Traumatic Stress Operations
	Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction

FIGURE 2. PROPOSED HLS OPERATIONAL TASKS THAT DOD AND SPECIFICALLY THE GUARD MAY BE ASK TO PERFORM.<sup>16</sup>

## CURRENT MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

A relevant force...missioned across the spectrum of contingencies...structured and resourced to accomplish its missions...capable and accessible when called...with trained citizen-soldiers committed to preserving the timeless traditions and values of service to our nation and communities.

—Army National Guard Vision 2010

To understand the role the Army National Guard plays in HLS, it's necessary first to define the organization in terms of its current mission, organization and psychological roots.

### DUAL MISSIONS

The National Guard is unique in that unlike the rest of the Army, it has both a Federal and State mission. The Guard is a federally funded and organized force, which is controlled by the Governors of the States and territories until federalized by the President.<sup>17</sup> The Militia Act of 1903 affirmed the National Guard as the Army's primary organized reserve. This status was updated and expanded in the National Defense Act of 1916, which gave the President authority to mobilize the Guard for the duration of war or national emergency and required the Guard to meet basic levels of training and be organized in accordance with Army directives.

With the passage of the National Guard Mobilization Act of 1933, federal law was amended designating the National Guard of the United States as a component of the Army at all times that could be ordered to active federal service by the President whenever Congress declared a national emergency.<sup>18</sup> The Guard's Federal mission, considered its **primary mission**,<sup>19</sup> is to *"maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency or as otherwise needed."* The State mission is to *"provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise required by state laws."*<sup>20</sup> By definition then, the mission of homeland defense has always been implied in both the federal and state mission set.

The Guard is a community-based organization with 3,222 armories located in 2,700 communities across the United States.<sup>21</sup> Its dual mission status and local basing make it the natural choice for any expanded HLS mission.

### ORGANIZATION

The Guard's designation as the official combat reserve of the Army combined with the implementation of the Total Force Policy in 1973<sup>22</sup> has linked it with the Army's ability to successfully execute operations across the full spectrum of conflict. The Army Guard comprises

38% of the total Army structure, including 56% of its combat forces, 36% of combat support and 33% of combat service support.<sup>23</sup> With the reduction of the active Army at the end of the Cold War, the Army cannot perform all the missions it is assigned without the Army Guard and the other Reserve components, i.e.; the Army Reserve (USAR), Navy Reserve (USNR), Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), Air Force Reserve (USAFR), the Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR) and the Air National Guard (ANG).

Each State, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia is allocated what is known as dual use base units for emergency response.<sup>24</sup> In addition, each State and its combat brigade-level and above units have been provided an information operation TDA, and full-time Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT).<sup>25</sup> Of special note the Guard has established ten full-time Civil Support Teams (CSTs) with twenty-two more scheduled for activation in support of WME incident response.<sup>26</sup>

## PSYCHOLOGICAL ROOTS

Finally, as the mission and the Guard's role in HLS expand, it is important to be cognizant of the potential cultural impact the increased HLS role may have on the Army Guard as an institution. The ARNG describes itself (as does the Army), in terms of combat divisions, brigades, armor, infantry, artillery, Special Forces and attack aviation. Guard leaders have always implied the mission of homeland security as a subset of the National Defense mission, but not the primary mission of the force. The last six generations of Guard leaders, since the National Defense Act of 1916, define themselves and the Guard in this language. These cultural roots are deeply ingrained and well established across the ARNG force.

Though the State mission (i.e.; HLS, consequence management in response to state emergencies, etc.) has been recognized since at least World War I, it has been treated as a secondary role. The primary role has been the task of warfighting.<sup>27</sup> The Guard's role as a combat force has had, and continues to have a major impact on how its leaders view the HLS mission in relation to its traditional roles as the combat reserve of the Army. Any significant change in the historical roles and missions will require a major paradigm shift in thinking. Additionally, there will be an increased requirement for retraining time.<sup>28</sup>

## COURSES OF ACTION

In determining viable courses of action, it is important to first state that many relevant Congressional committees, Department of Defense studies and think tanks agree that the

National Guard, because of its dual status and community roots, is the most logical DoD component to provide military support of HLS.<sup>29</sup> Though the AC and other reserve components will no doubt have critical roles in HLS, it is the Title 32 status of the ARNG with its immediate accessibility to the State Governors that sets it apart. There have been many possible solutions developed by both government and private groups in determining the best method for the military to support HLS requirements. The potential courses of action as recommended by the National Defense Panel (NDP) and Hart-Rudman Commission reports provide the clearest alternatives to date. They are outlined as follows:

### **National Defense Panel**

The National Defense Panel recommended that the Army Guard continue to provide combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict. Additionally, it recommends the ARNG continue to provide a Strategic Reserve, though at a reduced level. The bottom line is the NDP recommends lighter, more agile RC forces that are modernized through the cascading of equipment from the AC. A key component is the assignment of selected Guard units at battalion and below to active divisions and brigades. The NDP also envisions a mission for the Guard in overseas humanitarian and peace operations to reduce the OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO on the active Army.

Domestically, the NDP states it would increase the role of the National Guard in HLS with forces that are organized, trained and equipped to provide both training of civil agencies and immediate reinforcement of first responders' efforts in domestic emergencies, i.e.; WME, terrorism response, natural disasters, defense of critical infrastructure and information operations. This would also prepare Guard officers for command and staff positions in the newly authorized North American Command (USNORTHCOM). The panel further recommends that as new homeland defense missions develop, the National Guard should be used in lieu of active forces wherever possible. The Guard would do this by providing a combination of dual-purpose forces and HLS specific units reorganized from reduction of the Strategic Reserve.<sup>30</sup>

The advantages of this course of action are that it provides the Army maximum flexibility to respond across the full spectrum of conflict with its current force structure. This spreads the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO throughout the force providing depth to AC/RC "first responders" for any contingency across the spectrum of conflict, reducing risk. The NDP recommendation places emphasis on readiness across the force to insure the best response across the full spectrum of conflict, and as a means to reduce OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. It also reduces the

amount of reorganization and resulting costs in developing mission-specific forces. This course of action maintains the spirit of the Total Force Policy and reduces the possibility of conflict between the Army and its assigned reserve components. Finally, it assigns responsibility of HLS consequence management to one component within the Army.

The disadvantages of this course of action are that it may require expansion of Army, to include its Reserve Components, to meet the capabilities requirements as outlined in the QDR. This could translate into a larger, more expensive force structure in which a component's capability could be limited to a reduced specific level of conflict. A result could be the partial conversion of the Army from a war-fighting force to a more constabulary type force with no dual mission capability. This could result in an increase in OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, reduction in the flexibility of the force, and produce a moderate risk. With the Bush Administration's focus on maintaining current force structure levels, while increasing capability through transformation, any increase in force structure could further hamper the Army's fight for relevancy and resources.

#### **Hart-Rudman Commission**

The Hart-Rudman Commission recommended that the National Guard be given HLS as its primary mission and be reorganized and equipped with up-to-date equipment to accomplish that mission; that the National Guard redistribute resources that are currently allocated in preparing for the predominate mission of conventional war overseas to providing increased support to civil authorities in preparing for and responding to disasters, humanitarian relief, terrorism and particularly emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction and CBRNE incidents. The mission set would include assistance to local, state and regional planning for WME response, training and assistance to first responders; and planning and execution of inter-state support.

Concurrently, the commission recommends that DoD minimize forces with dual missions and reliance on active component forces that are detailed for major theater war. In conjunction with this reorganization of the Guard for HLS, the commission further recommends that the National Guard develop an overseas capability for international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.<sup>31</sup>

The advantages of this course of action are that it provides federal, state and local authorities with an organized, trained, equipped and dedicated force for HLS. It assigns the responsibility of consequence management within DoD for disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and HLS to one component within the Army and Air Force. This would also provide DoD with an organized, trained, equipped and dedicated force for overseas humanitarian relief and peacekeeping

operations (though Hart-Rudman seems to overlook that most of the Army's CS/CSS assets are in the USAR).

The disadvantages of the Hart-Rudman Commission recommendation are that it significantly reduces Army forces available for small-scale contingencies (SSCs) and major theater wars (MTWs) to include the Strategic Reserve as outlined in the QDR. The reorganization, reequipping and retraining of the National Guard would take considerable time and could be cost-prohibitive. This could also potentially provide a significant portion of the Army that is only trained, equipped and organized to function on the lower end of the mission spectrum, requiring a significant increase in the active force to meet current mission requirements. This course of action also violates the spirit of the Total Force Policy by creating separate forces for different mission sets and increasing the possibility of conflict between the Army and its Reserve Components.<sup>32</sup>

A final concern with this course of action is that it significantly increases strategic and operational risk by reducing flexibility, converting significant reserve force structure to a limited SSC mission set, thereby reducing war-fighting capability of the Army. It could also lead to significant political in-fighting as occurred during the 1993 Bottom-up Review (BUR) and the 1997 QDR. There is also the potential risk of political and economic repercussions in using ARNG forces as first responders in overseas humanitarian and peace-keeping operations, thus, bringing into question the use of AC forces only for missions on the mid-to-high range of the operations spectrum.

#### COMPARING COURSES OF ACTION

In determining the best course of action (COA), the following evaluative criteria were used to compare and contrast the Hart-Rudman and National Defense Panel recommendations:

- **Increasing DoD's HLS capability** – meeting the need as outlined in the 2001 QDR to provide additional DoD support to HLS, particularly in the mission areas of WME, terrorism response, critical infrastructure security, humanitarian relief and information operations. This criterion is weighted twice as important as the others.
- **Full spectrum operations** – the ability of the Army to continue to provide the capability to conduct operations across the full spectrum of conflict as outlined in the mission requirements of the 2001 QDR.

- **Flexibility** – the use of the current Army force structure metric to meet all requirements without increasing current OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO.
- **Total Force Policy** – the ability to provide a fully integrated, trained and equipped force with a common culture to provide unity of thought and action.
- **Risk** – the ability to accomplish all required missions as outlined in the 2001 QDR with the current force structure with moderate to low risk.
- **Political Feasibility** - reduces the possibility of conflict between the Army and its reserve components.
- **Cost** – minimizes additional cost both in personnel, equipment and training allowing the Army to maintain its focus on transformation and modernization within projected budgets.

In comparing ability to increase HLS capability, it's obvious that the Hart-Rudman plan for a dedicated HLS force is the best option. The NDP option also provides for forces specifically trained for HLS, but many of these would be dual-mission forces potentially involved in SSCs and warfighting as well.

In terms of full spectrum operations and flexibility, the NDP plan insures the total Army is available for operations across the total spectrum of conflict providing decision makers with increased capability. The Hart-Rudman plan does provide forces capable of operations at the lower spectrum, but would limit the active Army to providing forces only for peace operations and all warfighting missions. Hart-Rudman also implies a loss of ARNG CS/CSS forces needed to support the active Army if forces are not dual-missioned for both HLS and warfighting. With 56% of combat forces currently in the ARNG, the active force would have to be significantly increased to insure the Army can meet its requirements as outlined in the 2001 QDR. The training base would also need to be increased to train those low-density, high-demand specialties required for both HLS and warfighting.

If the National Guard's primary mission becomes HLS and the active Army and Army Reserve retain the warfighting mission as envisioned under Hart-Rudman, it could potentially lead to the development of two separate forces: a constabulary force for HLS, humanitarian relief and peacekeeping and a warfighting force for all other missions. This would have a negative impact on the current Total Force Policy. Additionally, cultural issues could lead to increased conflict between the Army and its reserve components over funding and other resource issues. Even as the importance of the HLS mission increases, the combat arms mission is so ingrained in the psyche and lineage of the ARNG that any significant reduction in this mission will most likely lead

to serious political in-fighting within the Army. This in-fighting could tear the U.S. Army apart in the short term, and lead to long-term challenges affecting readiness and relevance. The Army could be the bill payer in the long run in relation to the other services that would not have the same challenges with their reserve components.

Establishing specific mission forces within the Army without significant increase in active force structure could increase the risk factor significantly if the Army must respond to SSCs, HLS and one or more MTWs simultaneously. Additionally, increases in force structure and the requisite retraining, reequipping and reorganizing of the ARNG for HLS might prove to be too cost prohibitive and have a negative impact on transformation. Finally, lack of sufficient funding could also increase current OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO, resulting in over reliance on an already over-stretched force, and requiring limited budgets be spent on readiness instead of modernization.

#### ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE ARMY GUARD – A RECOMMENDATION

Based on the comparison of the two courses of action using the criteria above, the NDP recommendation is the most viable option for accomplishing all the Army's mission requirements, especially HLS, and as a guide for the reorganization of the National Guard.<sup>33</sup> This leads to the following four specific recommendations:

1. That further study be conducted to determine the definition and specific parameters of the mission of HLS.
2. That further study be conducted to determine the specific force structure requirements for the total range of potential Army missions as outlined in the 2001 QDR to include the actual force requirements for HLS.
3. That DoD and Department of the Army adopt the National Defense Panel recommendation as to organization, roles and missions for the Army National Guard that allows maximum flexibility across the full spectrum of operations.
4. That the Army National Guard retains designation as the primary DoD agency for disaster relief and that command and control of these operations are retained by the Adjutant Generals of the 54 states and territories.

## **REORGANIZING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TO BETTER PERFORM HOMELAND SECURITY/DEFENSE**

A total force, fully integrated, requires a common culture to engender unity of thought and action. Shared operational and training experiences, common educational opportunities, and frequent exchange of leaders between the active and reserve components serve to deepen mutual respect and reinforce a common ethic.

—1999 National Defense Panel Report

The first step to reorganizing the Army National Guard to better perform the Homeland Security/Defense mission begins with the clear understanding that any reorganization must take into account the full spectrum of conflict and how “The Army” must transform its components collectively to accomplish all mission sets leading to the end state of a relevant, ready force. This must be a team effort to stretch the limited resources available to meet the security needs of the nation.<sup>34</sup> The requirement for improved readiness combined with finite resources and changing mission priorities within the shifting nature of conflict will necessitate difficult decisions effecting both current organization and culture. The reorganization proposed is based on the following facts and assumptions:

### **FACTS**

- The 2001 QDR identifies defense of the United States as the highest priority of the U.S. military and a primary mission for the Reserve Components. Specifically the 2001 QDR states:<sup>35</sup>
  - DoD doesn’t currently have an approved definition of HLS, homeland defense or civil support and hasn’t defined the missions or forces required.
  - DoD intends to place greater emphasis on the capabilities of the Reserve and National Guard in support of local and State first responders.
  - DoD will increase emphasis on combating terrorism training for federal, state and local responders, using the capabilities of the National Guard and Reserve.
- DoD has built its new defense strategy from a threat-based to a capabilities-based approach, requiring a “broad-portfolio” of military capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict, using the current force structure metric as the baseline for end-structure in the future.<sup>36</sup>

- The lead agencies for all aspects of Homeland Security, except for land defense and National Missile Defense (NMD) will remain with civilian agencies with the Department of Defense (DoD) in support.
- Combat/CS/CSS assets of the ARNG will still be required to support the Army for overseas Major Theater War (MTW) and Small Scale Contingencies (SSC).
- HLS missions still need to be defined, but the most likely requirements are for military police, aviation, chemical, medical, engineer, transportation, information operations, civil affairs, and mortuary affairs units.<sup>37</sup>
- Based on the 2001 QDR, little or no increase in Army force structure is expected.
- Army transformation to include economies through out-sourcing and logistical reach-back will reduce some CS/CSS requirements, though Army Division Redesign (ADRS) in the ARNG will continue at its current rate.
- ARNG combat divisions will still be required as a base generation force, to support SSCs, as a strategic reserve and provide post-conflict Stability and Support (SASO) operations.
- Deployment times would be 24 hours or less for the HLS mission and 15 to 140 days to the warfighting CINCs depending on the size of the force and the mission set.<sup>38</sup>

#### A STATE OR REGIONAL APPROACH

The 2001 QDR added defending the homeland as a primary mission for the RC while reemphasizing the need for the RC in supporting the requirements of forward presence and the two MTW construct while conducting one or more SSCs concurrently. It also validated the current ARNG force structure as part of the baseline for accomplishing all requirements with moderate to high operational risk depending on the scenario. Numerous studies, including the National Defense Panel, Hart-Rudman Commission, Reserve Component Employment 05 (RCE05) study, RAND-Arroyo and Government Accounting Office (GAO) have sought to define the role of the Army National Guard in all mission sets across the spectrum of conflict.

The RCE05 study was the first major attempt since the 1993 BUR to conduct a complete assessment of the capabilities, organization and missions of the Reserve Components and its work has been used by the other studies in defining RC roles. The study focused on three areas: homeland defense, small-scale contingencies (SSC) and major theater war (MTW). The Missions and Capabilities panel of the RCE05 study determined that the RC are capable of executing virtually the same mission sets as the AC with few exceptions, primarily short-notice non-combatant (NEO) evacuations and select special operations missions.<sup>39</sup> Any restructuring or

reorganization of the ARNG must take into account the requirements to support all these missions as part of the Total Force.

In terms of HLS, the most likely mission is support of civilian authorities in the area of consequence management in response to an attack using CBRNE weapons. According to the RCE05 study, the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) response capability at the national level currently exists between the ARNG, USAR and USMC, but these units are needed to support the warfighting CINCs. DoD would have to convert approximately 10,000 positions in the ARNG to replicate this capability for HLS at the national level to cover the 76 largest cities, at an approximate cost of \$200 million. DoD would have to convert approximately 130,000-200,000 of the currently authorized 320,000 in the Army Guard to provide this capability to each individual State and territory.<sup>40</sup>

As with civil support missions, emergency response begins at the local level, expanding to State and Federal support when requested. Currently, there are 11 million civilian first responders including 600 HAZMAT teams covering the 120 largest U.S. cities. As a community based force, the Reserve Components are already "forward deployed" to support HLS missions. The ARNG is particularly suited for this mission due to their Title 32 status and peacetime control by the State Governors. The TAGs are currently integrated in the State emergency operations response system, with 22 serving as the chief operators in their State. All fifty states, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia have dual unit base (DUB) forces currently available to the Governor (or the mayor in the case of D.C.) for emergency response, but the majority of these units are also missioned for warfighting, and are probably not the right force mix for HLS. Though the final mission set has yet to be determined, most assessments currently agree that more chemical, MP, aviation, civil affairs (currently not found in the ARNG) and IO units are the critical shortages in planning and executing HLS missions.

Resourcing, both in terms of personnel, equipment and funding, is also a key element to ARNG reorganization. As a result of the Total Force Policy and budget considerations, the Army relies heavily on its RC for combat/CS/CSS support, especially since the end of the Cold War. It is uncertain at this time what economies can be gained to alleviate these shortfalls through transformation. Six of the ARNG Divisions and all fifteen eSBs are apportioned to the warfighting CINCs, leaving the remaining two divisions and three strategic brigades without a current wartime mission. During ADRS Phase I, the ARNG has converted six combat brigades to CS/CSS units to fill existing shortages in AC force structure. This will leave nineteen divisional and three separate combat brigades in the ARNG, of which six additional are scheduled to be

converted to CS/CSS units in ADRS Phase II & III. Restructuring and reorganization may help to alleviate some of the personnel issues, but major shortfalls in equipment, especially NBC, communications, airframes and wheeled vehicles will continue to pose a challenge in terms of readiness and total force interoperability.<sup>41</sup>

Therefore, sustaining and improving the readiness of ARNG units are a critical factor in determining how to reorganize. Any funding that becomes available should be apportioned to resolve the readiness issues of correcting equipment shortages, modernization, training of individuals and units; and for fulltime manning to sustain the force.

The shortage of fulltime manning continues to be a major impediment to improving and sustaining unit readiness. Though Congress has recognized the shortage problem and provided some Fulltime Manning relief,<sup>42</sup> improving and sustaining readiness, while reducing mobilization time is the most significant aspect of relevancy for the ARNG. Without this effort, the current ARNG structure is not a viable force.

The culture and politics of the ARNG are also critical factors in determining reorganization for HLS. The National Defense Act of 1933 made the ARNG a component of the Army at all times and designated it as the combat reserve of the Army. This is the mindset of much of the senior leadership and has become ingrained in the culture of the organization.<sup>43</sup>

The role of local, state and national politics must also be considered. The three major political organizations that will impact on reorganization are the Governors' Association, the Adjutant Generals' Association and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS). Any reorganization that eliminates major combat structure will no doubt lead to a political fight as happened with the 1997 QDR. However, the events of 11 Sep 2001 may cause the Governors' Association and in turn the AGs' Association to modify their position due to the proven threat to the homeland. Even with the events of 11 Sep 2001, it's highly unlikely that the President will expend his political capital to weigh in on this issue.<sup>44</sup>

## OPTIONS

Taking all this information into consideration, any options for reorganization and restructuring the ARNG must have some units that will be apportioned with HLS as their primary mission while other units are apportioned to the warfighting CINCs. Due to the current 2001 QDR mission/means construct, some of these units would also be dual-missioned to support all mission sets within the current force structure end strength. Two options become apparent:

providing each state and territory with its own dedicated HLS force or organizing select units to provide support on a regional basis.

#### **Provide Each State/Territory With Forces Required For HLS**

This option would provide each governor with a dedicated force organized specifically to accomplish the mission set for HLS. The bill payer would be conversion of the eight ARNG divisions and three strategic brigades leaving only the fifteen eSBs as ARNG combat arms capability for apportionment to the warfighting CINCs and the strategic reserve. Using the eSBs and retaining limited divisional CS/CSS assets could retain four ARNG divisions. CS/CSS units will probably have to be dual missioned to provide the required support across the spectrum of operations. Command and control (C2) for HLS would be the State Area Command (STARC) under the TAG with the warfighting units answering directly to their wartime chain of command.

The advantages of this type organization are that it would provide each State with maximum flexibility for responding to HLS missions with a force that is organized, equipped and apportioned to HLS as its primary mission. It would retain limited combat capability to support Army operations, though reducing combat forces by a minimum of four divisions and sixteen combat brigades. This option would also support completion of ADRS Phases II and III, providing the Army with the CS/CSS capabilities it requires, though some of these forces may have to be dual-missioned to support HLS. It would allow the allocation of any new resources to the primary military mission of HLS, cascading current combat arms equipment from those forces being reorganized to fill shortages in the remaining combat units. This reorganization would also reduce risk in responding to attacks on the homeland and other civil support missions by having a dedicated force, locally based in each state and territory.

Conversely, the disadvantages of this option are that it significantly reduces the Army's combat capability and the strategic reserve. With forces structured and organized specifically for HLS, it reduces the Army's forces available to respond across the spectrum of operations outside the U.S. especially mid and high intensity operations. The extensive dual missioning of CS/CSS units that would be required could also have a major impact if the nation must react to HLS, SSCs and a MTW concurrently. This significantly increases risk in responding to crises outside the U.S. Additionally, with fewer forces available it could increase the Army's PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO. Finally this option could increase political and cultural problems in the short-term by reducing and/or eliminating ARNG Divisions and much of the Guard's combat structure.

### **Provide Low Density, High Demand (LD/HD) Forces For HLS On A Regional Basis**

In this option, each State/territory would retain their current DUB forces but LD/HD units such as chemical, bio-medical and additional MPs would be allocated on a regional basis determined by population density. The USAR would provide civil affairs support by moving excess force structure positions to increase this capability in the USAR, or the ARNG would convert current structure to provide the needed civil affairs capability. The bill payer would be conversion of some of the divisional combat brigades and reallocation of some of the eSBs to provide combat power to maintain six ARNG divisions (two integrated and four traditional), capable of operating as divisional units. Aside from the regional forces, the State HLS units would be dual missioned to meet Army CS/CSS requirements. C2 for HLS would be the STARCs under the TAG.

This is an economy of force option that reduces resources required for the primary mission of HLS, allowing additional resources for upgrading ARNG combat/CS/CSS capability improving readiness in supporting all mission sets. This in turn retains increased combat capability to support the warfighting CINCs as well as providing the additional CS/CSS assets required to support "The Army". This also increases flexibility for responding to HLS missions at the regional/national level by balancing ends, ways and means to insure a well-trained, equipped and manned force. Politically, this option ameliorates the political and cultural problems by maintaining and upgrading a significant portion of the ARNG combat capability while providing the governors the proper force mix they need for HLS. This option would also maintain long term risk at the low to moderate level for most missions or combination of missions.

The principal disadvantage of this option is that it potentially limits flexibility of State response to HLS missions at the local/state level. It would require closer State-to-State coordination and cooperation across the force necessitating more local, state and federal coordination, synchronization and oversight. Politically it could increase the power of governors in the most populated states at the expense of those states and territories with smaller populations. Finally, it increases short-term risk in responding to attacks on the homeland by potentially increasing the mobilization and deployment time of specialized units.

### **ECONOMY OF FORCE IS THE ANSWER**

A complete assessment of missions and requirements is still needed to resolve this issue, but based on available information the best option is to provide LD/HD forces for HLS on a regional basis. This allows the governors' to retain their current DUB forces for immediate response with additional support from the region when needed. The TAGs through their STARCs provide

command and control with regional forces controlled through multi-state memorandum of agreement and federal oversight. This provides the Army with the minimum ARNG combat, combat support and combat service support forces required to support the full spectrum of operations at low to moderate risk. Finally, it provides a compromise solution to the political and cultural concerns of the Guard.<sup>45</sup>

To provide the best force within the resources available, the ARNG must complete ADRS Phases II and III as planned to provide the Army with the CS/CSS forces it requires. Four ARNG divisions can be retained, manned with one traditional and two eSBs each. Add to the two integrated divisions the CS/CSS to make these capable combat divisions, providing a total of six ARNG divisions from the original eight. The divisions will be responsible for the readiness and mobilization of their brigades with a goal of deploying the first battalion in 30 days or less and the remainder of the first brigade in 60 days or less. The goal for deploying the division should remain at 150 days or less per the RCE05 study. The 278<sup>th</sup> CAV Regiment would be retained as the only non-divisional eSB.

Finally, convert the remaining eight divisional combat brigades, three separate brigades and remaining divisional structure (120,000) to provide tailored forces for HLS. HLS becomes the primary mission (or third MTW) and has forces apportioned for that mission to the states and territories. Accept risk by dual missioning CS/CSS assets with first priority HLS and second apportionment to the warfighting CINCs.

## **CONCLUSION**

If you don't like change, you're going to like irrelevance even less.

—Gen Eric Shinseki, CSA

The events of 11 September 2001 have provided a wake-up call as to the importance of defending the United States from attack. The Reserve Components, especially the National Guard, is without doubt the best military organization to support civilian authorities in planning for and responding to the issues of homeland security. The National Guard, with its current community "forward presence" and Title 32 status under command and control of the governor in peacetime, is the ideal force for the local-response required for homeland security.

The cornerstone of any reorganization or restructuring of the Army Guard is readiness; that is, readiness across the force. The readiness of all units across the force translates into the ability to support operations across the full spectrum of conflict, which for the Army and Army Guard alike,

translates to relevance. As outlined in the 2001 QDR, this must be achieved under the current force levels and most likely without any major long-term increase in resources. This will require a concerted effort between the Army and its components, as well as across the services to achieve the nation's national security objectives. There must be willingness at every level of command; throughout the services and their components; among political organizations; and at the local, state and nation level to work together to make these goals a reality.

**WORD COUNT = 7,072**

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001. Chapter III, 18.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>3</sup> Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century: Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century. Washington: 15 February 2001, 25. The Department of Defense, Department of the Army, the National Guard Bureau, the National Defense Panel, Hart-Rudman Commission, the National Academy of Public Administration, Rand Arroyo Center, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the General Accounting Office all agree that the National Guard has a major role in HLS. The issue becomes not only what that role is, but also how it affects the current missions of the Guard, its organization and force structure both now and in the future.

<sup>4</sup> 2001 QDR., 19. Currently, there isn't an approved Department of Defense definition of Homeland Security. This remains as one of the major challenges in determining what the actual DoD requirements are and the forces needed to meet HLS missions.

<sup>5</sup> David M. Walker, Homeland Security, A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 21 September 2001., 3. Counting federal, state and local agencies, there are 11 million civilian responders and support personnel.

<sup>6</sup> 2001 QDR., 19. In assessing the current state of affairs vis-à-vis homeland security, the report states, "...the Department of Defense does not and cannot have the sole responsibility for homeland security. DoD must institutionalize definitions of homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support and address command relationships and responsibilities within the Defense Department. This will allow the Defense Department to identify and assign homeland security roles and missions as well as examine resource implications."

<sup>7</sup> Fritz Krauss, "Reorganizing the National Guard for Homeland Security, as proposed by California Army National Guard Strategic Planning Committee," briefing slides with outline notes, OTAG, State of California, Sacramento, CA. 9 November 2001. Slide 2. Most senior leaders in the Guard community accept the definitions as provided by the Anser Institute until such time as DoD establishes their own formal definitions for HLS.

<sup>8</sup> Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues and Options, RAND-Arroyo Center, June 2001., xv-xvi.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., xvii-xviii.

<sup>10</sup> LTC Antulio J. Echevarria II, "The Army and Homeland Security: A Strategic Perspective," March 2001. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 7. LTC Echevarria calls this the "all-hazards" definition.

<sup>11</sup> Because of the complexity and continued debate within DoD as to who will perform this mission, the Guard's role in NMD is not addressed in this paper.

<sup>12</sup> Echevarria., 7-9. As LTC Echevarria notes, "...the Army's HLS missions span a broad spectrum. In addition, they take place in parallel with other activities reflected in the Army's Spectrum of Operations." The sooner DoD can define HLS missions and priorities, the sooner the Army can develop its mission plans and allocate resources.

<sup>13</sup> Randy Larson, Dave McIntyre, and Mark DeMier, "A Primer on Homeland Security, Definitions of Strategic Functions, Anser Institute for Homeland Security: 2001, available from <<http://www.homelanddefense.org/bulletin/defintions.htm>. Internet. Accessed 3 Oct 2001. This document provides the definition of crisis management and consequence management as outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), "*United States Policy on Counterterrorism*."

**Crisis Management:** Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State and local governments provide assistance as required. Crisis management is – predominately a law enforcement response. [emphasis added] Based on the situation, a federal crisis management response may be supported by technical operation and by Federal consequence management, which may operate concurrently.

**Consequence Management:** Measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the States to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the Federal Government provides assistance as required.

<sup>14</sup> Michael E. Stout. Combating Biological Terrorism: Is Department of Defense Prepared to Support U.S. Government Interagency Quarantine Operations? Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 17 March 2000. 4-6.

<sup>15</sup> Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century., 25.

<sup>16</sup> Krauss. Slide 5. Larson. "Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security., 208-210.

<sup>17</sup> BG Michael J. Squier, "Army National Guard," briefing slides with notes, Arlington: U.S. National Guard Bureau, 14 May 2001

<sup>18</sup> National Guard Bureau. Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 2002 Posture Statement. Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2001., 92.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 92-93.

<sup>20</sup> National Guard Bureau. Army National Guard Vision 2010. Arlington: U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1997, 115.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 115-116. Army National Guard FY2002 Posture Statement., 92. The Total Force Policy "Requires all active and reserve military organizations be treated as a single integrated force, reinforcing the original intent of the founding fathers – a small standing army complemented by citizen-soldiers."

<sup>23</sup> Squier, brief and Army National Guard FY2002 Posture Statement, 30-31. Combat Arms: fifteen enhanced brigades, eight divisions and three strategic brigades and two special forces groups. CS/CSS: 49% of ADA battalions, 44% of corps attack helicopter battalions, 53% of medium helicopter units, 53% of maintenance units and 41% of combat engineer units. The composition of the ARNG is 52% combat arms, 17% CS, 22% CSS and 9% TDA.

<sup>24</sup> COL Lawrence Cooper, "Seven Key Questions proposed by AGAUS Strategic Planning Committee," briefing slides with outline notes, Office of the Adjutant General, State of California, Sacramento, CA, April 2001. To insure each State and territory has the right type forces to deal with local emergencies, each Governor is allocated what is known as the "Big 5 + 2", which are dual use base aviation, chemical, engineer, maintenance, medical, transportation and military police units.

<sup>25</sup> National Guard Bureau Memorandum, Subject: "All States Letter of Instruction – Information Operations," 5 November 1997.

<sup>26</sup> Department of Defense. Reserve Component Employment—2005. Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, July 1999., M-3. . Mark E. Gebicke, Combating Terrorism, Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 23 June 1999., 2, 5. According to the FBI and FEMA, who share responsibility for management of terrorist and WMD response, they question the need for the ARNG CSTs as additional assets that aren't required. They see the National Guard as only providing the personnel and equipment it has traditionally done in response to natural disasters or other emergencies. In addition to federal response teams, there are over 600 state and local HAZMAT teams that are the first responders covering the largest 120 cities in the nation.

<sup>27</sup> Army National Guard FY2002 Posture Statement, 30-31. Since the 1880s, the ARNG has fought to be recognized as the combat reserve of the Army. The National Defense Acts of 1916, 1922, 1933 and 1947, in addition to the Total Force Policy, have codified that goal.

<sup>28</sup> National Academy of Public Administration. The Role of the National Guard in Emergency Preparedness and Response: Report. Washington: January 1997, available from <<http://www.napawash.org/NAPA/NAPAPubs.nsf/>>. In its assessment of expanding the role of the National Guard in crisis and consequence management, the NAPA recognized the cultural bias of the ARNG as the key impediment to success.

<sup>29</sup> Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century., 25. The issue becomes not only what that role is, but also how it affects the current missions of the Guard, its organization and force structure both now and in the future.

<sup>30</sup> National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense-National Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Arlington, VA: December 1997, 53-55.

<sup>31</sup> Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century., 25-26.

<sup>32</sup> Zac Northrup, "Before and After," National Guard Review, Fall 2001, 9. One of the great fears of senior leaders in the Guard is the restructuring of all or part of the Army Guard into a constabulary type force rather than a warfighting force.

<sup>33</sup> 2001 QDR., 17-23. It is difficult to determine the best course of action and corresponding force-metric until we receive better definition of requirements for all missions outlined in the QDR. In addition, the QDR confirms the current force structure as presenting a moderate risk across the spectrum of operations, but I don't believe it provides an accurate picture of current Army Guard force structure. The QDR reflects eight Guard divisions and fifteen enhanced brigades. Following the 97 QDR and Off-site agreement, it was decided to convert 12 combat brigades to CS/CSS to make up for shortfalls of these assets in the AC, under a program known as Army Division Re-Design (ADRS). With phases I and II of this program completed, only three divisions (28ID (M), 29ID (L) & 49AD) remain complete divisions. The remaining five divisions have become "bobtail" divisions, losing a brigade combat-team each. This shortfall was to be made up by "embedding" an enhanced brigade in each division (40ID with 81<sup>st</sup> eSB was the first experiment in this program), requiring the division to be responsible for the readiness, mobilization and deployment of these brigades. Following the CSA announcement in Oct 2000 of division alignments with corps, it was thought that four Guard divisions would be added to the troop list (2 to Europe, 2 to Korea) as requested by the CinCs. However, if the Army decides to add one eSB to each AC division as a "round-up" brigade; expand the current two integrated divisions to the capability of being deployed as divisions; continue phase III and IV ADRS conversion and still maintain some form of strategic reserve, the question of what ARNG forces remain to be re-organized for HLS is a major question that remains unanswered.

<sup>34</sup> National Defense Panel., 51-55.

<sup>35</sup> 2001 QDR., 18-19., 30.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 13-15.

<sup>37</sup> Currently there are no Civil Affairs units in the ARNG. 98% of those units are in the USAR, with the remaining 2% in the AC. The USAR also retains all RC Mortuary Affairs units. Moving force structure spaces from the ARNG to the USAR, or creating new units in the ARNG could increase these specialties.

<sup>38</sup> Reserve Component Employment—2005., 14.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, Annex C, 3-4.

<sup>41</sup> Paul D. Monroe Jr., "The Role of the National Guard in Homeland Security." Statement of MG Monroe, AG, State of California before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, 13 December 2001, 3-5.

<sup>42</sup> John M Halliday, David Oaks, and Jerry M. Sollinger. Breaking the Mold: A New Paradigm for the Reserve Components. RAND-Arroyo Center, 2000. 3-5.

<sup>43</sup> Northrup, 10-11.

<sup>44</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>45</sup> *ibid.*, 13-14.



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